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ÖZETÇE 
Elektrik tüketimi ölçüm araçları, manuel olarak ölçüm 
yapılan analog sayaçlardan, elektrik tüketimi ile ilgili 
bilgileri toplayan ve elektrik dağıtım firmalarına ileten yeni 
akıllı sayaçlara doğru evrilmektedir. Sayaç verisinin 
okunmasını sağlayan tek yönlü otomatik sayaç okuma 
sistemlerinin (AMR) çıkışıyla sayaçlar akıllı şebeke 
yatırımlarının önemli bir kısmını oluşturmuştur. Otomatik 
sayaç okuma sistemleri ilk uygulamalar için cazip olmasına 
rağmen, çözülmesi gereken önemli bir husus olan talep tarafı 
yönetiminin AMR ile sağlanamadığı fark edilmiştir.  
 
AMR teknolojisinin kabiliyetlerinin tek yönlü sayaç verisi 
okuma ile sınırlı olması nedeniyle, sayaçlardan toplanan 
veriler üzerinden düzeltici önlemler alınmasına ve tüketicinin 
enerjiyi daha verimli akıllı kullanmasına yönelik özeliklere 
izin vermemektedir. Gelişmiş Ölçüm Altyapısı (AMI) ise akıllı 
sayaçlar ve dağıtım şirketleri arasında çift yönlü iletişim 
kurarak dağıtım şirketlerine sayaçlar üzerindeki 
parametreleri dinamik olarak değiştirme imkanı tanır. Bu 
nedenle, bu çalışmada AMI güvenliği üzerine 
odaklanılacaktır.   
 
Akıllı sayaç sistemlerinin yaygınlaşması ile birlikte, güvenlik 
bu sistemlerin gerekli ve kaçınılmaz bir ihtiyacı haline 
gelmektedir. Diğer taraftan, AMI sadece akıllı sayaçların 
fiziksel olarak dağıtımı manasına gelmemekte, ayrıca sayaç 
verilerinin yönetimi için gerekli olan karmaşık bir iletişim ağı 
ve bilgi teknolojileri altyapısını da içermektedir. Dolayısıyla 
güvenlik çözümlerini ele alırken geniş bir perspektifle 
yaklaşmak gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle de, sistemin kritik 
varlıkları belirlenmeli, tehditler iyi analiz edilmeli ve daha 
sonra güvenlik gereksinimleri iyi tanımlanmış olmalıdır. 
  
Bu çalışma AMI sisteminin temel güvenlik gereksinimleri, 
tehditlere karşı sistem kısıtlarını düşünerek olası çözümleri 
üzerine, şu anki güvenlik çözümlerini de resmederek, genel 
bir bakış sunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, AMI sisteminin 
güvenlik gereksinimleri analiz edilecek, kısıtlar belirlenecek 
ve olası güvenlik tehditlerine karşı olası karşı önlemler 
belirlenecektir.       
ABSTRACT 
Metering utilities have been replacing from analog meters 
that are read manually with new, smart meters that gather 
information about electricity consumption and transmit it 
back to electric companies. The metering has been the 
important part of the Smart Grid investments so far, with the 
initial introduction of one-way automated meter reading 
(AMR) systems to read meter data. Even though AMR 
technology proved to be initially enticing, utility companies 
have realized that AMR does not address demand-side 
management which is the major issue they need to solve. 
Since AMR’s capability is restricted to reading meter data 
due to its one-way communication system, it does not let 
utilities take corrective action based on the information 
gathered from the meters and does not assist customers in 
using energy intelligently. Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
(AMI) creates a two-way communication network between 
smart meters and utility systems and provides utilities the 
ability to modify service-level parameters dynamically. 
Therefore in this work we will also focus on AMI security 
practices. 
While smart metering systems are become widespread 
security is going to be the one of its essential and inevitable 
needs. On the other hand, AMI does not only mean the 
physical deployment of smart meters, but it also includes 
meter data management system which is a complicated 
communication network and IT infrastructure. Hence a broad 
perspective has to be adopted when security solutions are 
considered. Therefore, assets of the system must be identified, 
threats must be well analyzed and then security requirements 
must be well defined.  
This paper presents an overview on the main security 
requirements of the AMI, on the threats possible solutions 
considering the system constraints by picturing the current 
security solutions.  In this work, the security requirements for 
AMI systems will be analyzed, constraints will be determined 
and possible countermeasures against security threats will be 
given. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Smart Grid is used to enhance the efficiency of electricity 
usage and the communication among power generation, 
transmission and distribution systems. As a new emerging 
technology for smart grid, advanced metering infrastructure 
(AMI) system used to measure, collect, store, analyze, and use 
energy usage data. It provides a bridge between consumers and 
electric power utilities. The AMI is also responsible for 
transmitting requests, commands, pricing-information and 
software updates from the authorized parties to the smart 
meters. In the future utility companies will deliver energy and 
information to customers through a “smart” energy supply 
chain created by the convergence of electric, communication 
and information technologies [17]. 
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There are considerable numbers of benefits switching to AMI 
from the conventional energy distribution systems. From 
electric power utility companies point of view, AMI provides 
the ability of performing remote meter reading, remotely 
detecting power outages, performing remote diagnostics, 
accommodating variable power generation and storage option 
and finally offering more prepaid options to customers.  AMI 
ensures a better awareness of their energy usage, improved 
power quality, accurate billing and resolution of power failure 
issues for the customers. Also by using AMI, customers can 
make and execute intelligent decisions reading energy 
consumptions and storage  [3].   
 
As the AMI becomes reality, security threats from inside and 
outside of the system grow exponentially. For utilities, there is 
a high possibility of facing liability claims and regulatory fines 
if inadequate security technologies enable attackers to acquire 
and use AMI data. In addition, if customers think that a utility 
is abusing personal data, or is generally collecting information 
beyond what they assume acceptable, then they are likely to 
resist the implementation of AMI. Consumers may refuse to 
give permission, hide their data or pursue political opposition. 
Therefore, confidentiality for user privacy and meter data and 
authentication for meter reading and configuration messages, 
are two of the major security services need to be provided by 
AMI security architecture [9].  
 
In this work, firstly, an overview for AMI architecture will be 
given. After then, possible security threats and security 
requirements for the AMI will be discussed. Finally, based on 
these security requirements, appropriate security solutions will 
be given by considering the AMI constraints.  
 
1.1. AMI Communication Architecture 
The AMI system is not responsible only for collecting, 
analyzing, storing the metering data sent by the smart meters 
but also responsible for transmitting commands, pricing-
information and software updates to the smart meters. From 
the communication point of view, AMI system consists of the 
following components: Home Area Network (HAN) which is 
the network of smart home appliances, the smart meter which 
is source of measured data, data collector unit which is 
responsible for aggregating data sent from smart meters, wide 
area network which is a two way communication network that 
connects Data Collector Units and Data Management Center 
(DMC) and finally DMC that interacts with data collector 
units to handle metering data and also focuses on business 
application such as CRM, billing or payment systems. The 
given AMI infrastructure is represented in Figure 1. 
The vision for HANs is to connect the smart meter, smart 
appliances, electric vehicles, and on-site electricity generation, 
both for in home displays, data uploads, and to allow control 
of energy loads during peak demand periods. The 
communications needs of on premises applications are 
generally handled by low power, short distance wireless 
technologies. Technologies currently being used for HAN 
communications include 2.4 GHz WiFi, the common 802.11 
wireless networking protocol, ZigBee, which is based on the 
wireless IEEE 802.15.4 standard and HomePlug, a form of 
power line communications (PLC) that carries data over the 
existing electrical wiring in the home.  
 
Smart meters are connected to a Data Collector Unit, which 
acts as a gateway and is responsible for aggregating data sent 
from smart meters and transmits it to the DMC. For the smart 
meter Data Collector Unit communications, early AMI 
installations used narrowband PLC technology, which is used 
for relaying meter data and other internal communications 
over a utility’s power lines. Even though traditional PLC is 
narrowband, it is still the common transmission line for AMI 
functions in rural areas, where wireless coverage is less 
available[18]. Also, many AMI deployments, particularly in 
urban areas, use 900 MHz wireless mesh networks. For the 
higher throughput needs, broadband communications such as 
the IEEE 802.16e mobile WiMAX standard, broadband PLC, 
or next generation cellular technologies are the alternatives of 
the already mentioned technologies. 
 
Since the amount of metering data is growing dramatically due 
to the millions of communication between smart meters and 
utilities’ headend, the inevitable requirement of an AMI is the 
DMC. The DMC is responsible to collect and analyze 
metering data for further dynamic pricing, better customer 
service, outage management, demand response and energy 
consumption management purposes [5]. The backhaul of 
information from data collection points to the DMC typically 
functions over WAN which can be accomplished using a 
variety of technologies, such as Ethernet, fiber, T1, or 
commercial wireless networks [18]. 
 
2. SECURITY THREATS 
Lack of Integrity: Integrity for AMI systems means not only 
preventing changes to data as it is retrieved from the meter, 
but also the integrity of control commands, such as preventing 
unauthorized control commands from being transmitted 
through the AMI system to the smart meter or data collector 
unit since AMI network is open to external, unsecured 
environments  [1]. 
Lack of integrity may result in modification of the commands 
sent from the AMI DMC by attacker that change pricing 
signals, request load control actions, to reset meters, or to 
connect/disconnect loads and distributed generation. 
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Figure 1: Communication architecture of AMI 
 
Lack of Confidentiality: Confidentiality requires that only the 
sender and the intended receiver should understand the 
contents of a message. Confidentiality is needed to protect 
privacy at the customer site. Customers do not want 
unauthorized people or marketing firms to know how much 
energy they are using, how their signature of energy usage is. 
Utilities may also not want other competing utilities access 
their offers, activities or related information.   Therefore, 
communication in AMI network must be held confidential, 
including preventing the physical theft of meters for 
subsequent access to the stored data. 
 
Lack of Authentication: The identity and legality of the smart 
meters and associated consumers should be verified before 
joining the interconnected smart meter network and receiving 
proper utility service. However, authentication processes can 
be manipulated by an adversary to impersonate legitimate 
devices or expose systems to denial of service conditions 
When the field tools is used without performing authentication 
before gaining access, unauthorized entities become able to 
gather information about customers energy usage [4]. 
 
Lack of Replay Protection: Some cryptographic primitives 
accept received data as valid after checking that the data 
decrypts properly. However, without additional verification 
functions such as sequence counting, the protocol will be 
vulnerable to replay attacks, where an attacker can listen a 
valid encrypted data and retransmit it. An attacker can identify 
systems vulnerable to replay attacks by identifying the lack of 
unique identifiers in each cryptographic frame, or by 
observing repeated ciphertext content transmitted by one or 
more sources  [6].  
 
Crypto Related Flaws: Improper use of cryptography may 
enlarge the attack surface by giving attacker additional oracles.  
 
In stream ciphers, key stream data cannot be re-used without 
unsecuring the confidentiality of the cryptosystem. By 
implementation mistakes, having reused key stream data 
allows an attacker who observes a plaintext/ciphertext pair to 
recover the plaintext of an unknown ciphertext value. 
 
While some encryption algorithms are considered secure, the 
use of an insecure mode such as Electronic Codebook (ECB) 
can threaten the security of the cryptosystem allowing an 
attacker to deduce repetitions plaintext content from repeated 
ciphertext blocks. 
 
The use of weak integrity check functions allow an attacker to 
manipulate ciphertext data, allowing them to selectively 
modify data while preserving a valid integrity check value (so 
called "bit flipping" attacks), and may cause AMI system to 
accept unwanted command or data without realizing the 
alteration. It would be a disaster a hacker issuing disconnect 
commands to millions of meters because there was a weak 
integrity control or no way of checking at all of these 
commands. 
 
Encryption algorithms may provide insufficient protection 
against an attacker if key length is not long enough. This is 
most notable in symmetric ciphers such as the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES). On the other hand, without sufficiently 
randomness for key generation, all keys used by the algorithm 
are suspect, allowing an attacker the ability of guessing keys 
and decrypting data or impersonating trusted devices. 
 
Key Management: Even though the communication 
encrypted, extracting the encryption key from meter could be 
demonstrated if keys are not stored in a secure module or no 
anti-tamper mechanism is implemented. Hence, using the same 
encryption key on a large number of devices raises a system 
wide security problem; because when a potential attacker 
discovers this single key he could take over a large number of 
smart meters  [16]. Therefore avoiding symmetric 
cryptographic mechanisms and choosing asymmetric crypto 
would be a good practice.  
 
Design and Implementation Flaws: Design security flaws are 
made at multiple levels of the device design, including chip 
design, firmware, protocol, usage etc. For example, a 
communications protocol which allows access to key elements 
of the meter without authentication would be considered a 
design flaw  [6]. Implementation flaws are vulnerabilities 
which are caused by programming mistakes. These 
vulnerabilities are most commonly the results of programmers 
failing to consider or to understand the full impact of their 
code. The well-known implementation attack is called buffer 
overflow which is an anomaly where a program, while writing 
data to a buffer, overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites 
adjacent memory [19]. There are many causes of buffer 
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There are considerable numbers of benefits switching to AMI 
from the conventional energy distribution systems. From 
electric power utility companies point of view, AMI provides 
the ability of performing remote meter reading, remotely 
detecting power outages, performing remote diagnostics, 
accommodating variable power generation and storage option 
and finally offering more prepaid options to customers.  AMI 
ensures a better awareness of their energy usage, improved 
power quality, accurate billing and resolution of power failure 
issues for the customers. Also by using AMI, customers can 
make and execute intelligent decisions reading energy 
consumptions and storage  [3].   
 
As the AMI becomes reality, security threats from inside and 
outside of the system grow exponentially. For utilities, there is 
a high possibility of facing liability claims and regulatory fines 
if inadequate security technologies enable attackers to acquire 
and use AMI data. In addition, if customers think that a utility 
is abusing personal data, or is generally collecting information 
beyond what they assume acceptable, then they are likely to 
resist the implementation of AMI. Consumers may refuse to 
give permission, hide their data or pursue political opposition. 
Therefore, confidentiality for user privacy and meter data and 
authentication for meter reading and configuration messages, 
are two of the major security services need to be provided by 
AMI security architecture [9].  
 
In this work, firstly, an overview for AMI architecture will be 
given. After then, possible security threats and security 
requirements for the AMI will be discussed. Finally, based on 
these security requirements, appropriate security solutions will 
be given by considering the AMI constraints.  
 
1.1. AMI Communication Architecture 
The AMI system is not responsible only for collecting, 
analyzing, storing the metering data sent by the smart meters 
but also responsible for transmitting commands, pricing-
information and software updates to the smart meters. From 
the communication point of view, AMI system consists of the 
following components: Home Area Network (HAN) which is 
the network of smart home appliances, the smart meter which 
is source of measured data, data collector unit which is 
responsible for aggregating data sent from smart meters, wide 
area network which is a two way communication network that 
connects Data Collector Units and Data Management Center 
(DMC) and finally DMC that interacts with data collector 
units to handle metering data and also focuses on business 
application such as CRM, billing or payment systems. The 
given AMI infrastructure is represented in Figure 1. 
The vision for HANs is to connect the smart meter, smart 
appliances, electric vehicles, and on-site electricity generation, 
both for in home displays, data uploads, and to allow control 
of energy loads during peak demand periods. The 
communications needs of on premises applications are 
generally handled by low power, short distance wireless 
technologies. Technologies currently being used for HAN 
communications include 2.4 GHz WiFi, the common 802.11 
wireless networking protocol, ZigBee, which is based on the 
wireless IEEE 802.15.4 standard and HomePlug, a form of 
power line communications (PLC) that carries data over the 
existing electrical wiring in the home.  
 
Smart meters are connected to a Data Collector Unit, which 
acts as a gateway and is responsible for aggregating data sent 
from smart meters and transmits it to the DMC. For the smart 
meter Data Collector Unit communications, early AMI 
installations used narrowband PLC technology, which is used 
for relaying meter data and other internal communications 
over a utility’s power lines. Even though traditional PLC is 
narrowband, it is still the common transmission line for AMI 
functions in rural areas, where wireless coverage is less 
available[18]. Also, many AMI deployments, particularly in 
urban areas, use 900 MHz wireless mesh networks. For the 
higher throughput needs, broadband communications such as 
the IEEE 802.16e mobile WiMAX standard, broadband PLC, 
or next generation cellular technologies are the alternatives of 
the already mentioned technologies. 
 
Since the amount of metering data is growing dramatically due 
to the millions of communication between smart meters and 
utilities’ headend, the inevitable requirement of an AMI is the 
DMC. The DMC is responsible to collect and analyze 
metering data for further dynamic pricing, better customer 
service, outage management, demand response and energy 
consumption management purposes [5]. The backhaul of 
information from data collection points to the DMC typically 
functions over WAN which can be accomplished using a 
variety of technologies, such as Ethernet, fiber, T1, or 
commercial wireless networks [18]. 
 
2. SECURITY THREATS 
Lack of Integrity: Integrity for AMI systems means not only 
preventing changes to data as it is retrieved from the meter, 
but also the integrity of control commands, such as preventing 
unauthorized control commands from being transmitted 
through the AMI system to the smart meter or data collector 
unit since AMI network is open to external, unsecured 
environments  [1]. 
Lack of integrity may result in modification of the commands 
sent from the AMI DMC by attacker that change pricing 
signals, request load control actions, to reset meters, or to 
connect/disconnect loads and distributed generation. 
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Figure 1: Communication architecture of AMI 
 
Lack of Confidentiality: Confidentiality requires that only the 
sender and the intended receiver should understand the 
contents of a message. Confidentiality is needed to protect 
privacy at the customer site. Customers do not want 
unauthorized people or marketing firms to know how much 
energy they are using, how their signature of energy usage is. 
Utilities may also not want other competing utilities access 
their offers, activities or related information.   Therefore, 
communication in AMI network must be held confidential, 
including preventing the physical theft of meters for 
subsequent access to the stored data. 
 
Lack of Authentication: The identity and legality of the smart 
meters and associated consumers should be verified before 
joining the interconnected smart meter network and receiving 
proper utility service. However, authentication processes can 
be manipulated by an adversary to impersonate legitimate 
devices or expose systems to denial of service conditions 
When the field tools is used without performing authentication 
before gaining access, unauthorized entities become able to 
gather information about customers energy usage [4]. 
 
Lack of Replay Protection: Some cryptographic primitives 
accept received data as valid after checking that the data 
decrypts properly. However, without additional verification 
functions such as sequence counting, the protocol will be 
vulnerable to replay attacks, where an attacker can listen a 
valid encrypted data and retransmit it. An attacker can identify 
systems vulnerable to replay attacks by identifying the lack of 
unique identifiers in each cryptographic frame, or by 
observing repeated ciphertext content transmitted by one or 
more sources  [6].  
 
Crypto Related Flaws: Improper use of cryptography may 
enlarge the attack surface by giving attacker additional oracles.  
 
In stream ciphers, key stream data cannot be re-used without 
unsecuring the confidentiality of the cryptosystem. By 
implementation mistakes, having reused key stream data 
allows an attacker who observes a plaintext/ciphertext pair to 
recover the plaintext of an unknown ciphertext value. 
 
While some encryption algorithms are considered secure, the 
use of an insecure mode such as Electronic Codebook (ECB) 
can threaten the security of the cryptosystem allowing an 
attacker to deduce repetitions plaintext content from repeated 
ciphertext blocks. 
 
The use of weak integrity check functions allow an attacker to 
manipulate ciphertext data, allowing them to selectively 
modify data while preserving a valid integrity check value (so 
called "bit flipping" attacks), and may cause AMI system to 
accept unwanted command or data without realizing the 
alteration. It would be a disaster a hacker issuing disconnect 
commands to millions of meters because there was a weak 
integrity control or no way of checking at all of these 
commands. 
 
Encryption algorithms may provide insufficient protection 
against an attacker if key length is not long enough. This is 
most notable in symmetric ciphers such as the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES). On the other hand, without sufficiently 
randomness for key generation, all keys used by the algorithm 
are suspect, allowing an attacker the ability of guessing keys 
and decrypting data or impersonating trusted devices. 
 
Key Management: Even though the communication 
encrypted, extracting the encryption key from meter could be 
demonstrated if keys are not stored in a secure module or no 
anti-tamper mechanism is implemented. Hence, using the same 
encryption key on a large number of devices raises a system 
wide security problem; because when a potential attacker 
discovers this single key he could take over a large number of 
smart meters  [16]. Therefore avoiding symmetric 
cryptographic mechanisms and choosing asymmetric crypto 
would be a good practice.  
 
Design and Implementation Flaws: Design security flaws are 
made at multiple levels of the device design, including chip 
design, firmware, protocol, usage etc. For example, a 
communications protocol which allows access to key elements 
of the meter without authentication would be considered a 
design flaw  [6]. Implementation flaws are vulnerabilities 
which are caused by programming mistakes. These 
vulnerabilities are most commonly the results of programmers 
failing to consider or to understand the full impact of their 
code. The well-known implementation attack is called buffer 
overflow which is an anomaly where a program, while writing 
data to a buffer, overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites 
adjacent memory [19]. There are many causes of buffer 
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overflows, most of which are made possible by the abuse of 
API calls.  
  
3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Open Smart Grid (OpenSG) and some other organizations are 
working for identifying the security requirements of AMI in 
order to safely integrate the smart grid technology into the 
power grid system  [15].In this section we give an overview of 
the security requirement not only network security point of 
view but also information system security point of view. 
 
Confidentiality: The AMI system design and implementation 
shall protect the confidentiality of the communication where 
necessary. The information transmitted in an AMI system may 
have confidentiality requirements because it must ensure the 
privacy of customer and business information. The 
confidentiality requirements can be violated both intentionally 
and unintentionally and can lead to system instability, 
malfunction, privacy violation, loss of business advantage, and 
a host of other impacts. The confidentiality requirement 
should be implemented such that the latency introduced by 
security functions shall not affect the performance or degrade 
the functionality. 
 
Integrity: The AMI security architecture shall protect the 
integrity of meter data and control and configuration 
commands being altered without detection. The AMI security 
architecture shall employ cryptographic mechanisms for 
ensuring detect of changes in information transmitted. It is 
important to use cryptographically strong integrity 
mechanisms since weak algorithm may cause vulnerabilities as 
mentioned earlier.  
 
Availability: AMI security architecture shall ensure that data 
and systems are up and operational when they are needed. 
AMI components shall protect against or limit the effects of 
denial-of-service attacks. The AMI system should restrict the 
ability of internal or external users to launch denial-of-service 
attacks against other AMI components or networks. The AMI 
system should manage excess capacity, bandwidth, or other 
redundancy to limit the effects of information flooding types 
of denial-of-service attacks. Wireless assets and networks are 
also vulnerable to radio-frequency jamming and steps should 
be taken and personnel trained to address tracking and 
resolution of such issues. If communication within the AMI 
system relies on a name/address resolution service then it shall 
be designed and protected to provide sufficiently reliable 
services. The utility shall monitor address resolution traffic to 
identify potentially malicious patterns of behavior.  
 
Device Identification and Authentication: The AMI system 
shall employ a mechanism to identify and authenticate specific 
components before establishing a connection. Device 
authentication is a common layer of defense and presents a 
hurtle that attackers shall overcome before gaining access to a 
system. This also prevents attackers from gaining access to the 
AMI system by spoofing existing devices. 
The authentication mechanisms in the AMI component/system 
shall obfuscate feedback of authentication information during 
the authentication process to protect the information from 
possible exploitation by unauthorized individuals. This applies 
to authentication by one component to another as well as by 
individuals. This control blocks several known attacks to user 
authentication including user enumeration, cached form field 
extraction, authentication sniffing, and brute force 
optimizations  [8]. 
AMI devices are able to support lightweight automatic 
authentication mechanism which is suitable for embedded 
system. Moreover, mutual authentication between devices is 
required for efficient network configuration because there is 
hierarchy dependency on network configuration between 
DMC and meter. It cannot be obtained using existing 
authentication protocol like Kerberos because meter cannot 
communicate with authentication server without passing 
through DMC.  
 
Access Control and Access Control Management: The 
security architecture shall provide security measures to restrict 
access and input to the AMI system to authorized personnel 
only. All communications between AMI components shall be 
authenticated.  
The AMI components with user interfaces shall limit the 
number of consecutive invalid attempts by a user during a 
given time period. The component disables user accounts 
when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is 
exceeded and logs all unsuccessful login attempts. 
 
If password based authentication method is employed, 
passwords shall not be embedded into tools, source code, 
scripts, aliases or shortcuts. It is the fact that many AMI 
components and software are shipped with factory default 
authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and 
configuration. In these case default password must be changed 
before deployment of the component since factory default 
authentication credentials are often well known, easily 
discoverable, present a great security risk. 
For symmetric/password-based authentication, the AMI 
system [17]: 
 Shall protect passwords from unauthorized 
disclosure and modification when stored or 
transmitted; 
 Shall prohibit passwords from being displayed when 
entered; 
 Shall enforce password lifetime restrictions; 
 Shall employ counter for maximum number of 
unsuccessful attempts. 
For asymmetric/PKI-based authentication, the AMI system 
[17]: 
 
 Shall validate certificates by constructing a 
certification path to an accepted trust anchor; 
 Shall enforce authorized access to and use of the 
corresponding private key; 
 Shall map the authenticated identity to the user 
account. 
 Shall restrict field tools password and keys life-span 
in case they are stolen. 
 
 
                        
Key Management: AMI security architecture shall provide 
management policies of keys such as key generation, 
distribution, renewal and revocation. Successful key 
management is critical to the security of a cryptosystem.  Even 
if you design the most secure system, a security breach in the 
key management such as outdated keys, lack of revocation 
mechanism or the careless personnel who is the weakest link 
would ruin whole system. Key management considered as the 
most difficult aspect of cryptography because it involves 
system policy, user training, organizational and departmental 
interactions, and coordination between all of these 
elements  [8]. 
 
Security Services and Protocols: AMI security architecture 
shall provide controlling and monitoring protocols and 
services. All allowed protocols and services should be 
identified and explicitly authorized with all others being 
filtered out of the system and denied all access that is white 
listing approach. 
 
Malicious Code Protection: From a system perspective, 
malicious code protection mechanisms shall be deployed in 
such a manner as to limit the impact of the attack to a small 
geographical area prior to detection and termination. These 
include critical entry and exit points between HAN, meters, 
aggregation points and WAN.  
The AMI meter should ensure that no malicious code can pass 
from the consumer’s HAN to the utility’s network. 
Cyber Security Related Requirements: All components of 
the AMI system or any device connected to the AMI network 
shall employ host hardening, including patch application and 
security concerning configurations of the operating system, 
browsers, and other network related software.  [7]. 
Intrusion detection systems shall be installed within each 
network segment with event monitoring / event response and 
subsequent prevent for incoming and outgoing network traffic, 
including anti-virus, anti-spyware and signature and anomaly-
based traffic monitors  [7]. It is also highly recommended that 
an AMI network be appropriately isolated from any general-
purpose enterprise networks as they can introduce risks. 
Access Control Lists shall be employed at all points which 
bridge data collector segments to WAN to limit incoming and 
outgoing connections to only those necessary to support the 
AMI system  [7]. 
All firmware/software shall be checked against malwares and 
viruses prior to loading on any component of the AMI system 
or device connected to the AMI network. Smart meters or data 
collector unit shall not allow uploading of any executable code 
from the consumer’s HAN  [7]. 
 
Field Tools: The utility shall use approved and certified field 
tools. Utility is responsible to manage, protect, and monitor 
the use of field tools and shall maintain the integrity of these 
tools on an ongoing basis. Field tools also represent a 
potentially higher risk due to their portability and likelihood of 
being connected to numerous networks. If not properly 
secured and controlled, they can be a mechanism to bypass 
security controls and allow malicious code to be transported 
from one security zone to another. 
 
Remote Maintenance: The DMC shall authorize, manage, 
and monitor remotely executed maintenance and diagnostic 
activities of the AMI system. The utility shall audit all remote 
maintenance and diagnostic sessions and authorized personnel 
review the maintenance records of the remote sessions. 
 
Security Functionality Verification: AMI system shall verify 
that all security functions within the component are in an 
online/active state upon component and system startup and 
restart; upon command by a user with appropriate privilege or 
periodically. 
 
Separation of Duties and Least Privilege: The utility shall 
establish appropriate assignment of responsibility and separate 
duties as needed to eliminate conflicts of interest in the roles. 
Input to an AMI system that may alter its physical 
configuration must be limited to personnel who routinely need 
to make such adjustments in the performance of their duties. 
All AMI components shall employ the concept of least 
privilege for all accounts, protocols, and services and enforce 
the most restrictive set of roles. Services and protocols shall 
not be run under root or administrator accounts.  
  
Monitoring, Logging, Reporting: AMI system shall detect, 
log and report necessary security events, security 
malbehaviours and system activities to the AMI management 
system. The utility shall also develop, disseminate, and 
periodically review and update system and information 
security policy and procedures. 
4. SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
4.1. System Constraints 
Cost effectiveness (Computation and memory constraints): 
Smart meters need to be very cost effective because millions 
will be purchased. The meter needs to perform  a number of 
tasks essentially unrelated to security, such as storing meter 
readings, interfacing to many different AMI network 
technologies,, providing self diagnostics, etc. Adding 
additional features to improve security or adding compute 
power for encryption/decryption, can increase the cost of the 
meter  [1],  [3].  
 
Location: Smart meters will generally be located in very 
physically unprotected locations since they can easily be 
reached by the public.  Therefore both physical and cyber 
access could be easily performed  [1],  [3]. 
 
Bandwidth limitation: The smart grid’s communications 
network is mostly composed by low bandwidth (Ziggbee, Wi-
fi, narrowband PLC) carriers. So security solutions which 
needs the transmission of large encryption keys and 
certificates will be limited by throughput availability  [2]. 
 
Variety of Network Modules: The entities in smart grid AMI 
system are a blend of devices from numerous commercial and 
network providers each having its unique features, 
communication mechanisms and limitations. Therefore, the 
security technology emphasizes a complete range of solutions 
that complies with differing needs of respective network 
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overflows, most of which are made possible by the abuse of 
API calls.  
  
3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Open Smart Grid (OpenSG) and some other organizations are 
working for identifying the security requirements of AMI in 
order to safely integrate the smart grid technology into the 
power grid system  [15].In this section we give an overview of 
the security requirement not only network security point of 
view but also information system security point of view. 
 
Confidentiality: The AMI system design and implementation 
shall protect the confidentiality of the communication where 
necessary. The information transmitted in an AMI system may 
have confidentiality requirements because it must ensure the 
privacy of customer and business information. The 
confidentiality requirements can be violated both intentionally 
and unintentionally and can lead to system instability, 
malfunction, privacy violation, loss of business advantage, and 
a host of other impacts. The confidentiality requirement 
should be implemented such that the latency introduced by 
security functions shall not affect the performance or degrade 
the functionality. 
 
Integrity: The AMI security architecture shall protect the 
integrity of meter data and control and configuration 
commands being altered without detection. The AMI security 
architecture shall employ cryptographic mechanisms for 
ensuring detect of changes in information transmitted. It is 
important to use cryptographically strong integrity 
mechanisms since weak algorithm may cause vulnerabilities as 
mentioned earlier.  
 
Availability: AMI security architecture shall ensure that data 
and systems are up and operational when they are needed. 
AMI components shall protect against or limit the effects of 
denial-of-service attacks. The AMI system should restrict the 
ability of internal or external users to launch denial-of-service 
attacks against other AMI components or networks. The AMI 
system should manage excess capacity, bandwidth, or other 
redundancy to limit the effects of information flooding types 
of denial-of-service attacks. Wireless assets and networks are 
also vulnerable to radio-frequency jamming and steps should 
be taken and personnel trained to address tracking and 
resolution of such issues. If communication within the AMI 
system relies on a name/address resolution service then it shall 
be designed and protected to provide sufficiently reliable 
services. The utility shall monitor address resolution traffic to 
identify potentially malicious patterns of behavior.  
 
Device Identification and Authentication: The AMI system 
shall employ a mechanism to identify and authenticate specific 
components before establishing a connection. Device 
authentication is a common layer of defense and presents a 
hurtle that attackers shall overcome before gaining access to a 
system. This also prevents attackers from gaining access to the 
AMI system by spoofing existing devices. 
The authentication mechanisms in the AMI component/system 
shall obfuscate feedback of authentication information during 
the authentication process to protect the information from 
possible exploitation by unauthorized individuals. This applies 
to authentication by one component to another as well as by 
individuals. This control blocks several known attacks to user 
authentication including user enumeration, cached form field 
extraction, authentication sniffing, and brute force 
optimizations  [8]. 
AMI devices are able to support lightweight automatic 
authentication mechanism which is suitable for embedded 
system. Moreover, mutual authentication between devices is 
required for efficient network configuration because there is 
hierarchy dependency on network configuration between 
DMC and meter. It cannot be obtained using existing 
authentication protocol like Kerberos because meter cannot 
communicate with authentication server without passing 
through DMC.  
 
Access Control and Access Control Management: The 
security architecture shall provide security measures to restrict 
access and input to the AMI system to authorized personnel 
only. All communications between AMI components shall be 
authenticated.  
The AMI components with user interfaces shall limit the 
number of consecutive invalid attempts by a user during a 
given time period. The component disables user accounts 
when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is 
exceeded and logs all unsuccessful login attempts. 
 
If password based authentication method is employed, 
passwords shall not be embedded into tools, source code, 
scripts, aliases or shortcuts. It is the fact that many AMI 
components and software are shipped with factory default 
authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and 
configuration. In these case default password must be changed 
before deployment of the component since factory default 
authentication credentials are often well known, easily 
discoverable, present a great security risk. 
For symmetric/password-based authentication, the AMI 
system [17]: 
 Shall protect passwords from unauthorized 
disclosure and modification when stored or 
transmitted; 
 Shall prohibit passwords from being displayed when 
entered; 
 Shall enforce password lifetime restrictions; 
 Shall employ counter for maximum number of 
unsuccessful attempts. 
For asymmetric/PKI-based authentication, the AMI system 
[17]: 
 
 Shall validate certificates by constructing a 
certification path to an accepted trust anchor; 
 Shall enforce authorized access to and use of the 
corresponding private key; 
 Shall map the authenticated identity to the user 
account. 
 Shall restrict field tools password and keys life-span 
in case they are stolen. 
 
 
                        
Key Management: AMI security architecture shall provide 
management policies of keys such as key generation, 
distribution, renewal and revocation. Successful key 
management is critical to the security of a cryptosystem.  Even 
if you design the most secure system, a security breach in the 
key management such as outdated keys, lack of revocation 
mechanism or the careless personnel who is the weakest link 
would ruin whole system. Key management considered as the 
most difficult aspect of cryptography because it involves 
system policy, user training, organizational and departmental 
interactions, and coordination between all of these 
elements  [8]. 
 
Security Services and Protocols: AMI security architecture 
shall provide controlling and monitoring protocols and 
services. All allowed protocols and services should be 
identified and explicitly authorized with all others being 
filtered out of the system and denied all access that is white 
listing approach. 
 
Malicious Code Protection: From a system perspective, 
malicious code protection mechanisms shall be deployed in 
such a manner as to limit the impact of the attack to a small 
geographical area prior to detection and termination. These 
include critical entry and exit points between HAN, meters, 
aggregation points and WAN.  
The AMI meter should ensure that no malicious code can pass 
from the consumer’s HAN to the utility’s network. 
Cyber Security Related Requirements: All components of 
the AMI system or any device connected to the AMI network 
shall employ host hardening, including patch application and 
security concerning configurations of the operating system, 
browsers, and other network related software.  [7]. 
Intrusion detection systems shall be installed within each 
network segment with event monitoring / event response and 
subsequent prevent for incoming and outgoing network traffic, 
including anti-virus, anti-spyware and signature and anomaly-
based traffic monitors  [7]. It is also highly recommended that 
an AMI network be appropriately isolated from any general-
purpose enterprise networks as they can introduce risks. 
Access Control Lists shall be employed at all points which 
bridge data collector segments to WAN to limit incoming and 
outgoing connections to only those necessary to support the 
AMI system  [7]. 
All firmware/software shall be checked against malwares and 
viruses prior to loading on any component of the AMI system 
or device connected to the AMI network. Smart meters or data 
collector unit shall not allow uploading of any executable code 
from the consumer’s HAN  [7]. 
 
Field Tools: The utility shall use approved and certified field 
tools. Utility is responsible to manage, protect, and monitor 
the use of field tools and shall maintain the integrity of these 
tools on an ongoing basis. Field tools also represent a 
potentially higher risk due to their portability and likelihood of 
being connected to numerous networks. If not properly 
secured and controlled, they can be a mechanism to bypass 
security controls and allow malicious code to be transported 
from one security zone to another. 
 
Remote Maintenance: The DMC shall authorize, manage, 
and monitor remotely executed maintenance and diagnostic 
activities of the AMI system. The utility shall audit all remote 
maintenance and diagnostic sessions and authorized personnel 
review the maintenance records of the remote sessions. 
 
Security Functionality Verification: AMI system shall verify 
that all security functions within the component are in an 
online/active state upon component and system startup and 
restart; upon command by a user with appropriate privilege or 
periodically. 
 
Separation of Duties and Least Privilege: The utility shall 
establish appropriate assignment of responsibility and separate 
duties as needed to eliminate conflicts of interest in the roles. 
Input to an AMI system that may alter its physical 
configuration must be limited to personnel who routinely need 
to make such adjustments in the performance of their duties. 
All AMI components shall employ the concept of least 
privilege for all accounts, protocols, and services and enforce 
the most restrictive set of roles. Services and protocols shall 
not be run under root or administrator accounts.  
  
Monitoring, Logging, Reporting: AMI system shall detect, 
log and report necessary security events, security 
malbehaviours and system activities to the AMI management 
system. The utility shall also develop, disseminate, and 
periodically review and update system and information 
security policy and procedures. 
4. SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
4.1. System Constraints 
Cost effectiveness (Computation and memory constraints): 
Smart meters need to be very cost effective because millions 
will be purchased. The meter needs to perform  a number of 
tasks essentially unrelated to security, such as storing meter 
readings, interfacing to many different AMI network 
technologies,, providing self diagnostics, etc. Adding 
additional features to improve security or adding compute 
power for encryption/decryption, can increase the cost of the 
meter  [1],  [3].  
 
Location: Smart meters will generally be located in very 
physically unprotected locations since they can easily be 
reached by the public.  Therefore both physical and cyber 
access could be easily performed  [1],  [3]. 
 
Bandwidth limitation: The smart grid’s communications 
network is mostly composed by low bandwidth (Ziggbee, Wi-
fi, narrowband PLC) carriers. So security solutions which 
needs the transmission of large encryption keys and 
certificates will be limited by throughput availability  [2]. 
 
Variety of Network Modules: The entities in smart grid AMI 
system are a blend of devices from numerous commercial and 
network providers each having its unique features, 
communication mechanisms and limitations. Therefore, the 
security technology emphasizes a complete range of solutions 
that complies with differing needs of respective network 
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domains  [3]. Additionally, it requires a lot of efforts to model 
a standardized security framework that accompanies with 
agreements across different vendors and legacy systems.  
 
Power: Smart meters are battery powered devices so that they 
still perform metering functions even on loss of power. A 
cyber-attacks may be accomplished to harvest battery that 
cause denial of service and unavailability of the meter. 
4.2. Security Solutions 
Since AMI is a new concept for power distribution solutions, 
in the literature, there are a few security solutions regarding 
AMI. In this section these solutions will be given and 
discussed. 
 
In  [4], they proposed a protocol, to provide efficient secure 
AMI communications by a protocol called integrated 
authentication and confidentiality (IAC). They claimed that by 
IAC, an AMI system can provide trust services, data privacy, 
and integrity by mutual authentications whenever a new smart 
meter initiates and joins the smart grid AMI network.  The 
proposed IAC protocol employs mutual authentication 
between a remote server located in the local management 
office and a neighboring smart meter as the authenticator to 
obtain proper cryptographic keys for consequent secure data 
communications. Therefore, readings from smart meters and/or 
local management offices can employ encryption and message 
authentication mechanisms tailored for the security 
requirements and system constraints. In each smart meter and 
the collecting node, they use a block cipher SEED for 
encryption/decryption and hash based message authentication 
code (HMAC) for message authentication code generation. 
 
In  [10], they proposed a key management scheme for AMI.  
The proposed key management framework is constructed 
based on the key graph. Furthermore, three different key 
management processes are designed to deal with the hybrid 
transmission modes, including key management for unicast, 
broadcast, and multicast modes. They claimed that relatively 
simple cryptographic algorithms are chosen for key generation 
and refreshing policies due to the storage and computation 
constraints of SMs. They used symmetric algorithms (AES-
128, HMAC) and hash functions for proposed key 
management framework.  
 
In  [11], they proposed a security architecture for AMI which 
use Power Line Communication technology. This proposed 
protocol includes key generation and provisioning to devices 
without exposure; initialization to authenticate devices in the 
network and key sharing between devices before exchanging 
data, secure transmission of meter-reading data, and 
revocation management to handle discarded devices from the 
network. They claimed that proposed protocol provides strong 
authentication of devices and data, prevents a single point of 
failure by adopting secret sharing through multiple certificate 
authorities and reduces the risk of denial-of-service attacks on 
the server by hop-by-hop authentication for data transmitted 
from terminal nodes to the server. They use a block cipher 
algorithm for meter readings transmission and the process of 
deducing a session key from the shared key. The proposed 
protocol uses an authenticated encryption scheme for 
encrypting the meter readings and public-key encryption 
scheme for the encryption of the shared key in the shared key 
transportation protocol. Also every sub-protocol in proposed 
architecture exploits the digital signature scheme. 
 
In  [12], they claimed that they propose an ID-based 
authentication protocol for the advanced metering 
infrastructure, which provides source authentication, data 
integrity and non-repudiation services, while preserving the 
end-customer’s privacy. Proposed protocol involves three 
phases: System setup phase, Node initialization/Private key 
generation phase and Data Source Authentication phase. For 
signature generation/verification over the certificates, they use 
the ECDSA signature scheme. 
5. CONCLUSION 
As a critical component of the smart grid communication 
infrastructure, AMI is open to variety of security threats for 
all AMI components including the reliability of smart grid 
operations due to devices being placed in physically insecure 
locations. Therefore the holistic design of AMI security 
architecture is a crucial task. 
 
Since designing security architecture is inevitable for AMI, in 
this paper, security issues regarding AMI technology is 
discussed by picturing the possible AMI architecture. AMI 
security threats and security requirements is given and 
possible security solutions are discussed by considering 
system constraints.  
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Power: Smart meters are battery powered devices so that they 
still perform metering functions even on loss of power. A 
cyber-attacks may be accomplished to harvest battery that 
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4.2. Security Solutions 
Since AMI is a new concept for power distribution solutions, 
in the literature, there are a few security solutions regarding 
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authentication and confidentiality (IAC). They claimed that by 
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